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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-HEALTH CARE
PROFESSIONALS SEEK TO ADVERTISE-Friedman v.
Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979); American Medical Association, Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) No. 409, Part II (FTC Oct. 12, 1979).
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has said that commercial
speech does enjoy some, but not all, of the protections of the first
amendment.' Challenges to state regulation of commercial speech
in order to determine the outer limits of the protection and gov-
ernment challenges to self-imposed ethical restrictions on profes-
sional advertising have kept the field in a state of constant flux.2 In
Friedman v. Rogers3 one such challenge was decided in favor of the
state's power to suppress the commercial speech advanced. Recog-
nizing the possibility to deceive or mislead the public if profession-
als were allowed to practice under trade names, the Supreme Court
held that the Constitution permitted a state to impose limited reg-
ulations on such commercial speech. Within months of Friedman,
the Federal Trade Commission, exercising its power to prevent un-
fair methods of competition, ordered the American Medical Associ-
ation to modify their ethical restrictions on physician advertising
and patient solicitation.4 The FTC order affected various other
professional organizations, including the American Dental Associa-
tion, which had agreed to abide by it. 5
Presently North Carolina, like many other states, regulates
many of the advertising activities of professionals.6 Friedman has
1. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (protection for com-
mercial speech not as great as noncommercial speech); Pittsburg Press Co. v.
Pittsburg Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (commercial speech
proposing a purely legal activity might enjoy same protection).
2. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679
(1978); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
3. 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
4. American Medical Ass'n, TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 409, Part II (FTC
Oct. 12, 1979).
5. TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,562 (1979).
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-14 (Supp. 1979) (Board able to suspend or revoke
license of any physician or surgeon who engages in any "unprofessional conduct,
including, but not limited to, any departure from . . . the ethics of the medical
profession." This would seem to include the ethical restrictions on patient solici-
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increased the burden of proof on the states in justifying their regu-
lation of commercial speech; and the FTC decision has removed
most ethical restrictions on physician advertising, which is very
significant to North Carolina, given the extensive prior regulation.
With the recent trends in the application of the first amendment
to commercial speech, evidenced by Friedman and the FTC's entry
into the field, state regulation and ethical restrictions on profes-
sional advertising must be liberalized if they are to survive these
challenges.
THE CASES
A. FRIEDMAN V. ROGERS
In response to some rather alarming abuses and deceptive
practices in Texas,7 the Texas Legislature adopted the Texas Op-
tometry Act.8 In section 5.13 of the Act were the professional re-
sponsibility rule for the practice of optometry and many of the
business regulations.9 It prohibited optometrists from practicing
under an assumed, trade or corporate name and from allowing as-
sociation of their names with optometrical offices at which they
were not practicing.10
tation and advertising by physicians that were at the heart of the controversy in
American Medical Ass'n.); id. § 90-41 (1975) (dentists prohibited from direct and
indirect solicitation of professional patronage); N.C. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILrrY, DR 2-102 (restrictions on manner and content of attorney
advertisements).
7. See Texas State Bd. of Examiners in Optometry v. Carp, 412 S.W.2d 307
(Tex.), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 52 (1967) (some of the practices
included the use of multiple trade names within the same community to give the
appearance of competition, changing names of offices from time to time and re-
taining the trade names used by optometrists whose businesses had been pur-
chased and who were no longer working at the establishment). Note that Rogers
was a party in this action as 'well as in Friedman.
8. "rEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4552-1.1 et seq. (Vernon 1976).
9. Subsection (c) of section 5.13 prohibited fee splitting and bonus arrange-
ments based in whole or in part on the business or income of the optical company.
10. Compare TEx. REV. STAT. ANN. art. 4552-5-13(d) (Vernon 1976):
No optometrist shall practice or continue to practice optometry under, or
use in connection with his practice of optometry, any assumed name, cor-
porate name, trade name, or any name other than the name under which
he is licensed to practice optometry in Texas; provided, however, that
optometrists practicing as partners may practice under the full or last
names of the partners;
with N.C. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsIBILrry, DR 2-102(B):
[Vol. 2:173
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Plaintiff Rogers advocated the commercial practice of optome-
try1 and operated a series of optometrical offices under the name
Texas State Optical (TSO)., He brought an action for declaratory
and injunctive relief from the enforcement of section 5.13 and
other provisions of the Act to determine his right to conduct a pro-
fessional practice under a trade name.1" A three-judge federal dis-
trict court was convened, and it rejected the State's argument that
the operation of optometrical offices under the name Texas State
Optical was misleading to the public. The district court found that
"the Texas State Optical name has come to communicate to the
consuming public information as to certain standards of price and
quantity, and availability of particular routine services."" The dis-
trict court balanced Rogers' constitutional interests in the com-
mercial speech advanced and the State's interests in regulating it
and, relying primarily on Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.'4 and Bates v. State Bar
of Arizona,1 5 held that section 5.13(d) was an unconstitutional re-
striction on the free flow of commercial information protected by
the first amendment. 6 Texas appealed to the Supreme Court from
this ruling. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's ruling
and held the Texas regulations to be a valid exercise of the State's
police powers to protect the public from the deceptive and mis-
a lawyer in private practice shall not practice under a trade name, a
name that is misleading as to the identity of the lawyer or lawyers prac-
ticing under such name, or a firm name containing names other than
those of one or more of the lawyers in the firm.
11. "Commercial" practice of optometry is characterized by an emphasis on
high volume and high speed in examinations, usually on a walk-in, first-come,
first-served basis. It entails the use of multiple offices, extensive use of media
advertising and practice under a trade name. In contrast, the "professional" prac-
tice of optometry places emphasis on gaining patients on the basis of the optome-
trist's reputation, examination by appointment and a lack of commercial mer-
chandising techniques. Jurisdictional Statement for Appellant (Rogers) at 5,
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
12. In Texas State Bd. of Examiners in Optometry v. Carp, 412'S.W.2d 307
(Tex.), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 52 (1967), the testimony showed
that Dr. Rogers had had no ownership in or control over several of the Texas
State Optical shops but merely had sold the name to them to use.
13. Rogers v. Friedman, 438 F. Supp. 428, 431 (E.D. Tex. 1977), rev'd in part,
440 U.S. 1 (1979).
14. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
15. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
16. Rogers v. Friedman, 438 F. Supp. 428, 431 (E.D. Tex. 1977), rev'd in part,
440 U.S. 1 (1979).
1980]
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leading use of trade names by professionals.1 7
B. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION --
In a complaint issued in 1975, the Federal Trade Commission
charged the American Medical Association and two constituent
members located in Connecticut with violating section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act through ethical restrictions on ad-
vertising and solicitation. Specifically, the FTC complaint charged
that the AMA had agreed with others to prevent or hinder its phy-
sician members from soliciting business (by advertising or other-
wise), engaged in price competition or otherwise engaged in com-
petitive practices. 18 Noting that the AMA represented fifty-five
percent of the physicians in the United States, the FTC adminis-
trative law judge found that the challenged practices had placed a
"formidable impediment to competition in the delivery of health
care services by physicians in this country."19 The judge ordered
that the AMA "cease and desist from engaging in the challenged
practices and revoke and rescind any existing ethical principles or
guidelines which restrict physicians' advertising, solicitation or
contractual relations." 20 The full Commission concurred in the ad-
ministrative law judge's finding that the FTC had jurisdiction over
the AMA. It found that the AMA was a company or association
organized to carry on business for its own profit or that of its mem-
bers within the meaning of section 4 of the FTC Act and that their
acts and practices were in or affecting commerce as required by
section 5- of the Act.21 While still requiring the AMA to drop its
current ethical restrictions on advertising and patient solicitation
by its members, the full Commission modified the administrative
law judge's recommended order to permit the AMA to adopt and
enforce reasonable ethical guidelines concerning advertising that is
false or deceptive.22
17. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. at 15-16 (1979).
18. [1976-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) $ 21,491.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 409, Part II, at 3-18 (FTC Oct. 12, 1979).
22. Id. at 58.
[Vol. 2:173
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BACKGROUND
A. CONSTITUTIONAL ATTACKS
A major obstacle that confronted challenges to state restric-
tions of commercial speech was the United States Supreme Court's
adoption of the commercial speech doctrine. The commercial
speech doctrine is directly traceable to Valentine v. Chrestensen.23
At issue was a New York statute that prohibited the distribution
of any handbill, circular or other advertising matter whatsoever in
or on any street. Defendant had distributed commercial handbills
with a message critical of the ordinance on the back. Dismissing
the ,message as an attempt to avoid the ordinance, a unanimous
Court sustained the ordinance. The Court said that while the state
could not unduly burden the communication of information and
dissemination of opinion, "equally clear. . . the Constitution im-
poses no such restraint on government as respects purely commer-
cial advertising."" This exception to the first amendment received
further support in Breard v. Alexandria in which the Court up-
held a conviction for violation for an ordinance banning door-to-
door soliciations of magazine subscriptions. Since the selling
"brings into the transaction a commercial feature," the Court rea-
soned the solicitation lacked first amendment protections.26
Members of the Court have criticized this extreme attitude;7'
however, not until Bigelow v. Virginia"2 was this extreme view
moderated to any great extent. While in the earlier case of Pitts-
burg Press Co. v. Pittsburg Commission on Human Relations 9 the
Court had implied that commercial speech which proposes a purely
legal commercial activity might be entitled to first amendment
protections, the Bigelow decision went much further. In Bigelow
23. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
24. Id. at 54.
25. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
26. Id. at 642-43.
27. Mr. Justice Douglas, who was a member of the Supreme Court when
Chrestensen was decided and who joined that opinion, observed: "The ruling was
casual, almost offhand. And it has not survived reflection." Cammarano v. United
States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421
U.S. 809, 820 n.6 (1975). "There is some doubt concerning whether the 'commer-
cial speech' distinction announced in Valentine v. Chrestensen . . . retains con-
tinuing validity." Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 314 n.6 (1974)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
28. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
29. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
1980]
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the Court said,
[t]o the extent that commercial activity is subject to regulation,
the relationship of speech to that activity may be one factor,
among others, to be considered in weighing the First Amendment
interest against the governmental interest alleged. Advertising is
not thereby stripped of all First Amendment protection. The rela-
tionship of speech to the marketplace of products or of services
does not make it valueless in the marketplace of ideas.
.. . Regardless of the particular label asserted by the
State-whether it calls speech "commercial" or "commercial ad-
vertising" or "solicitation"-a court may not escape the task of
assessing the First Amendment interest at stake and weighing it
against the public interest allegedly served by the regulation. 0
The question remaining for the Court to answer was the ex-
tent of the protection: at what point would the governmental inter-
ests be sufficient to outweigh the constitutional protections? This
question was of special interest to professionals. The Court's an-
swer in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc.3 1 and Bates v. State Bar of Arizona3 2
made clear that commercial speech could be regulated in some in-
stances, but the Court failed to specify guidelines for the lower
courts' determinations of deceptive or misleading-and, therefore,
unprotected-speech.
Virginia Board of Pharmacy involved a Virginia statute de-
claring the advertising of prescription drug prices by a licensed
pharmacist to be unprofessional conduct. Declaring the statute in-
valid, the Court held that speech which "does no more than pro-
pose a commercial transaction" was not wholly outside the protec-
tions of the first amendment.33 The Court refused, however, to
extend full first amendment protection to commercial speech. The
Court said that just as restrictions on the time, place or manner of
expression were permissible under certain circumstances, restric-
tions on false, deceptive or misleading commercial speech were
equally permissible." Although "much commercial speech is not
30. 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975).
31. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
32. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
33. 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (quoting from Pittsburg Press Co., 413 U.S. at
385).
34. Id. at 771. The Court said that untruthful speech, commercial or other-
wise, never has been protected for its own sake, citing Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974), and Konigsberg v. State Bar of Calif., 366 U.S. 36
[Vol. 2:173
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provably false, or even wholly false," but rather it is "only decep-
tive or misleading," the Court foresaw no obstacle to a state effec-
tively regulating such speech.3 5 The Court said that the first
amendment does not prohibit the states from insuring that the
stream of commercial information "flow[s] cleanly as well as
freely." 36 The greater objectivity and hardiness of commercial
speech makes toleration of inaccurate statements for fear of silenc-
ing the speaker less necessary.87 The state may require that the
commercial speech advanced appear in such a form or include ad-
ditional information as is necessary to prevent it from deceiving
the recipient. 8
In Bates the Court was confronted with a state statute that
prohibited advertising by attorneys. The State Bar of Arizona had
disciplined the firm of Bates and O'Steen for advertising prices for
routine legal services. On appeal from the Arizona Supreme Court
to the United States Supreme Court, the State Bar argued that
attorney advertising, and by implication advertising by any profes-
sional who dispensed services rather than quantifiable goods, was
inherently misleading. This argument was particularly attractive to
the State Bar as it appeared to have had the backing of the Court
in general and the Chief Justice in particular in Virginia Board of
Pharmacy.9 The Court rejected this argument but did state that
some forms of advertising could be misleading and, therefore,
would be subject to restrictions imposed by the states.' 0 In a later
case involving solicitation of business by a professional,'41 the Court
observed:
To require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial
and noncommercial speech alike could invite dilution, simply by a
leveling process, of the force of the Amendment's guarantee with
49, n.10 (1961).
35. Id. at 771.
36. Id. at 771-72.
37. Id. at 772 n.24. Compare New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964) with Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove, 404 U.S. 898 (1971).
38. 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976); cf. United States v. 95 Barrels of Vinegar,
265 U.S. 438, 443 (1924) ("[iut is not difficult to choose statements, designs and
devices which will not deceive"). Compare Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) with Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir.
1968), cert. denied sub nom. Tobacco Inst., Inc. v. FCC, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
39. 425 U.S. 748, 773 n.25, 773-74 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
40. 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977).
41. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
19801
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respect to the latter kind of speech. Rather than subject the First
Amendment to such a devitalization, we instead have afforded
commercial speech a limited measure of protection, commensu-
rate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amend-
ment values, while allowing modes of regulation that might be im-
permissible in the realm of noncommercial expression.2
The court in Federal Trade Commission v. Simeon Manage-
ment Corp.43 gave meaning to the concept of what constitutes false
or deceptive commercial speech. The court of appeals held that
"an advertisement is misleading only if it fails to disclose facts
necessary to dissipate false assumptions likely to arise in light of
the representations actually made. ' 44 The court of appeals also ob-
served that
[t]here is disagreement as to whether such false assumptions
must be actively promoted by the advertisement, or whether it is
sufficient that an advertisement fails to correct an independant
existing misapprehension about its product. But there is no de-
ception under either standard unless the public holds a belief
contrary to material facts not disclosed. 46
Other courts have held that neither intent to deceive nor actual
deception need be shown;46 a mere likelihood or propensity to
deceive is sufficient.4 7 "Whether particular advertising has a ten-
dency to deceive or mislead is obviously an impressionistic deter-
mination more closely akin to a finding of fact than a conclusion of
law.",48
42. Id. at 456.
43. 532 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1976).
44. Id. at 716.
45. Id. See generally Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1047-51 (1967); Note, Yes, FTC, There Is a Virginia: The
Impact of Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun-
cil, Inc. on the FTC's Regulation of Misleading Advertising, 57 B.U.L. REV. 833
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Misleading Advertising].
46. Regina Corp. v. FTC, 322 F.2d 765, 768 (3d Cir. 1963); FTC v. Sterling
Drug., Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 1963).
47. See Resort Car Rental Sys. v. FTC, 518 F.2d 962, 964 (9th Cir. 1974);
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. FTC, 379 F.2d 666 (7th Cir. 1967); Bankers Sec.
Corp. v. FTC, 297 F.2d 403, 405 (3d Cir. 1961); Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879, 896
(9th Cir. 1960).
48. Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 617 (3d Cir. 1976); cf. FTC v. Col-
gate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965) ("the words 'deceptive practices' set
forth a legal standard and they must get their final meaning from judicial
construction").
[Vol. 2:173
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A restriction on the use of trade names by professionals-a
form of commercial speech that Texas felt was inherently mislead-
ing and deceptive-confronted the Court in Friedman.
B. STATUTORY ATTACKS
Professional associations often have adopted ethical restric-
tions which have had distinct anticompetitive effects. 49 Because of
these effects, private individuals and the United States have
brought several challenges to the legality of these restrictions. Two
of these challenges reached the United States Supreme Court:
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar50 and National Society of Profes-
sional Engineers v. United States;1 a third, American Medical
Association,52 probably will reach it in the near future.
In Goldfarb the Court was confronted with a private antitrust
suit challenging a minimum-fee schedule published by the Fairfax
County Bar Association and enforced by the Virginia State Bar,
through published reports and ethical opinions.5 Holding that the
minimum-fee schedule violated section 1 of the Sherman Act," the
Court said that the schedule and its enforcement constituted price-
fixing as
a fixed, rigid price floor arose from respondent's activities: every
lawyer who responded to petitioners' inquiries adhered to the fee
schedule, and no lawyer asked for additional information in order
to set an individualized fee .... The fee schedule was enforced
through the prospect of professional discipline from the State
Bar, and the desire of attorneys to comply with announced pro-
fessional norms.55
The Court rejected the county bar's plea for a total exclusion from
49. Examples of such restrictions are: prohibitions on attorney advertising
(the American Bar Association), prohibitions on competitive bidding by members
(the National Society of Professional Engineers), minimum fee schedules (the Vir-
ginia Bar Association) and prohibitions on physician advertising (the American
Medical Association).
50. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
51. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
52. TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 409, Part I (FTC Oct. 12, 1979).
53. 421 U.S. 773, 777 (1975). One such ethical opinion stated that "evidence
that an attorney habitually charges less than the suggested minimum fee sched-
ule adopted by his local bar Association, raises a presumption that such lawyer is
guilty of misconduct." Id. at 777-78.
54. Id. at 780-93.
55. Id. at 781.
1980]
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antitrust regulation as such finding would allow attorneys "to
adopt anticompetitive practices with impunity." 6 Having previ-
ously found that Congress had intended to "bring within the Act
every person engaged in business whose activities might restrain or
monopolize commercial intercourse among the states, ' 57 the Court
found that the activities of lawyers played an important part in
that commercial intercourse." The Court noted that certain prac-
tices by members of a learned profession might survive scrutiny
under the Rule of Reason even though they would be viewed as a
violation of the Sherman Act in another context.8 9
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distin-
guished from a business is, of course, relevant in determining
whether that particular restraint violates the Sherman Act. It
would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as inter-
changeable with other business activities, and automatically to
apply to the professions antitrust concepts which originated in
other areas. The public service aspect, and other features of the
professions, may require that a particular practice, which could
properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another
context, be treated differently. 60
Professional Engineers61 involved a civil antitrust suit brought
by the United States against the National Society of Engineers al-
leging that the Society's canon of ethics prohibiting its members
from submitting competitive bids for engineering services violated
section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Court noted that while ethical
norms may serve to regulate and promote competition and thus
fall within the Rule of Reason, the ethical restrictions employed by
the Society were "a far cry from such a position." 2 The Court ob-
served that
56. Id. at 787.
57. Id. at 788 (quoting United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n,
322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944)).
58. Id.
59. Id. For cases developing and applying the rule of reason, see Chicago Bd.
of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); United States v. National Soc'y of
Professional Eng'rs, 404 F. Supp. 457, 461 (D.D.C. 1975) ("Under the ,rule of rea-
son the legality of restraints on trade is determined by weighing all the factors of
the case such as 'the history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason
for adopting the particular remedy and the purpose or end sought to be at-
tained' "); Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wins. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 247 (1711).
60. 421 U.S. 773, 788 n.17 (1975).
61. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
62. Id. at 696.
182 [Vol. 2:173
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the equation of competition with deception, like the similar equa-
tion with safety hazards, is simply too broad; we may assume that
competition is not entirely conducive to ethical behavior, but that
is not a reason, cognizable under the Sherman Act, for doing away
with competition. In sum, the Rule of Reason does not support a
defense based on the assumption that competition itself is
unreasonable."
It was this Rule of Reason analysis that the Federal Trade
Commission employed to evaluate the ethical restrictions on physi-
cian advertising imposed by the American Medical Association.
ANALYSIS
A. FRIEDMAN V. ROGERS
In Friedman the Court appears to have placed a rather sub-
stantial burden of proof on the state. To justify suppression of
commercial speech, the state must show either that the general
public's understanding of the advertisement will be inherently mis-
leading or that the potential for abuse is substantial, well demon-
strated and not speculative or hypothetical.s
Trade names are distinguishable from the commercial speech
employed in Virginia Board of Pharmacy and Bates. The messages
advanced in those cases were self-contained and self-explanatory, 5
whereas, as Justice Powell noted, "a trade name conveys no infor-
mation about the price or nature of the services offered by an op-
tometrist until it acquires meaning over a period of time by as-
sociations formed in the minds of the public between the name
and some standard of price or quality."" The Court noted that
63. Id. The Society of Professional Engineers argued that the submission of
competitive bids for engineering services not only would deceive those who re-
quested the bids as to the cost of the work but also would cause safety hazards as
engineers cut corners in order to be more competitive.
64. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13 (1979).
65. Id. at 12.
66. Id. In note 11 of the opinion, the Court observed: "A-trade name that has
acquired such associations to the extent of establishing a secondary meaning be-
comes a valuable property of the business, protected from appropriation by
others." Because of this value, the FTC is required to find that the deceptive or
misleading use of the trade name cannot be remedied by any means other than
proscription before it can prohibit its use under section 5. See FTC v. Royal Mill-
ing Co., 288 U.S. 212 (1933). But, the Court noted,
a property interest in a means of communication does not enlarge or di-
minish the First Amendment protection of that communication. Accord-
1980]
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loosely defined associations of trade names with price or quality
present a danger of such information being manipulated to deceive
or mislead the consuming public.17 The Court took particular care
to mention the history of deceptive and misleading uses of trade
names that had been present in Texas and had led to the promul-
gation of regulations prohibiting the use of trade names by optom-
etrists." Because a trade name does not identify the person with
whom the consumer deals (in this case a licensed professional), any
optometrist or professional advertising only under a trade name
can avoid the necessity of maintaining a good reputation as to his
work. As such the trade name "frees an optometrist from depen-
dence on his personal reputation to attract clients, and even allows
him to assume a new trade name if negligence or misconduct casts
a shadow over the old one." 69 Because it fails to affix professional
responsibility, the use of trade names by professionals has a long
history of disapproval, 0 which the Court continued in Friedman.
The Court distinguished Virginia Board of Pharmacy and
Bates from Friedman on another basis. In both cases, as in
Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro,7 1 the state
statutes in question were complete prohibitions on the use of infor-
mational advertising by the seller of the good or services. Here,
however, the Texas Optometry Act permits an optometrist to ad-
vertise not only the price of his goods and services but to some
extent the quality of his services.7 2 Alluding to the dissenters' as-
sertions that the Act virtually had abolished a legal form of prac-
tice, the majority noted that "[t]he use of a trade name also facili-
tates the advertising essential to large scale commercial practices
with numerous branch offices, conduct the State rationally may
wish to discourage while not prohibiting commercial optometrical
ingly, there is no First Amendment rule, comparable to the limitation on
section 5, requiring a State to allow deceptive or misleading commercial
speech whenever the publication of additional information can clarify or
offset the effects of the spurious communication.
440 U.S. at - n.11.
67. Id. at 12-13.
68. Id. at 13-14.
69. Id. at 13.
70. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 318 (1967).
71. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
72. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4552-5.09(a) (Vernon 1976), which prohib-
ited price advertising by optometrists, was declared to violate the first amend-
ment by the district court in Rogers v. Friedman, 438 F. Supp. 428, 429 (E.D.
Tex. 1977), rev'd in part, 440 U.S. 1 (1979). No appeal was taken from this ruling.
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practice altogether. 7 3 In essence, the Court found that the State
merely had required that the advertising optometrist include such
additional information in his advertisements so that they would
not be deceptive. 4 Thus, the commercial speech advanced would
"flow cleanly as well as freely.
75
Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, argued that a trade name
was an extremely valuable asset 76 and that the majority had over-
estimated the potential for deception and underestimated the
harmful impact of section 5.13 on first amendment rights." As the
practice of "commercial" optometry was still legal in Texas, "[iut
follows . . . that Texas has abridged the First Amendment rights
of. . . Doctor Rogers . . . by absolutely prohibiting, without rea-
sonable justification; the dissemination of truthful information
about wholly legal commercial conduct. '78 Blackmun argued that
neither of the two reasons proferred by the State and adopted by
the majority justified "a statute so sweeping as section 5.13(d). 79
B. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION
The Federal Trade Commission in American Medical Associa-
tion took a position on deceptive or false advertising substantially
similar to the Court's position in Friedman and Bates. Where the
professional advertising is inherently misleading or presents a sub-
stantial potential for abuse, it would be a proper subject for "an
ethical precept narrowly directed toward [the] false or deceptive
advertising or unfair solicitation." 80 Competition, however, may
not be equated with deception."
Where professional ethical norms present substantial re-
straints on competition, the test of their legality0 is
whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as
may suppress or even destroy competition. As the Court observed
73. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13 (1979).
74. Id. at 16.
75. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 (1976).
76. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 22 (1979).
77. Id. at 20.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 24.
80. TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 409, Part II, at 32 (FTC Oct. 12, 1979).
81. Id. at 32 (quoting from National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978)).
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in Professional Engineers, the unreasonableness of trade restric-
tions can be based either (1) on the nature or character of the
contracts, or (2) on surrounding circumstances giving rise to the
inference or presumption that they were intended to restrain
trade and enhance prices. . . .Thus, the contours of the analysis
required under the rule of reason will vary somewhat depending
upon the nature of the restraint.2
The AMA, in its Principles of Medical Ethics, banned all solicita-
tion which it defined as "any attempt to obtain patients or pa-
tronage by persuasion or influence. '83 Such a sweeping ban by the
AMA clearly proscribes almost all forms of advertising-including
price advertising-whether deceptive or not. "Given the integral
function of advertising and other forms of solicitation to. . .com-
petition in . . .society, [the] AMA's broad proscription of adver-
tising and solicitation has [had], by its very essence, significant ad-
verse effects on competition among the AMA's members."8"
Having found that the ethical restriction had a distinct ad-
verse effect on competition, the Commission then compared the
"alleged procompetitive virtues of the challenged restraints against
[the] anticompetitive evils. '85 Balancing the AMA's proferred rea-
sons for the restrictions (to prevent false or deceptive advertising
and unfair solicitation) against the need for competition, the Fed-
eral Trade Commission concluded:
that [the] AMA's justification for the challenged restraints bears
no reasonable relationship to legitimate, procompetitive concerns
and that such justification is entitled to little weight in the overall
balance of competitive effects. [The] AMA's wholesale restrictions
on advertising and solicitation impede communication of ... in-
formation re'sulting in significant fee disparity and economic
harm to consumers. Whether viewed alone, or in conjunction with
other evidence or purpose and effect, [the] AMA's restraints on
advertising and solicitation impede competition.8
CONCLUSION
Society, the object of commercial speech, has an interest in
such information: using it to make informed judgments with re-
82. Id. at 26.
83. Id. at 27.
84. Id. at 28.
85. Id. at 31.
86. Id. at 33-34.
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spect to commercial transactions." The advertiser has an interest
in disseminating the information to consumers in order to per-
suade them to purchase his product. Truthful and complete adver-
tising serves to implement these goals; however, when the commer-
cial speech advanced reasonably may cause the consumer to be
misled, "it loses its informative value and first amendment inter-
ests attenuate. Moreover, misleading advertising directly impli-
cates the government's interest in preventing sales induced by
means of misrepresentation. 8 8 Thus, the leeway for misleading,
deceptive or false expression that has been allowed in other con-
texts has had little force in the commercial arena.8 9
The potential for abuse in advertising by professionals, espe-
cially in the medical and legal fields, is clear where the advertise-
ments claim superior legal abilities or set forth "alluring promises
or relief." 90 The court will hold advertisements which present such
claims to be sufficiently misleading to justify state suppression,
and the state should have no difficulty in showing that they fit into
at least one of the two categories set forth in Friedman and Ameri-
can Medical Association.
The restrained professional advertisement, which, although
potentially misleading, is not inherently misleading will present
the states with their biggest headaches. So long as the restrained
professional advertising is confined to advertisements that are
truthful and capable of verification,9" the state will have to prove
that the potential for abuse is substantial and not hypothetical.
87. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976).
88. Misleading Advertising, supra note 45. In the note, the author proposes a
three-part test for the court to apply in its determination of whether or not a
particular advertisement is misleading. In order to be found to be misleading, he
argues: (1) the advertisement must be one that a reasonable person could inter-
pret as making a false assertion, (2) the definition of misleading advertising
should be limited to assertions of facts that could be material in eliciting an eco-
nomic response and (3) the misrepresentations must be material in inducing an
economic response.
89. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977).
90. Talsky v. Department of Registration and Educ., 68 Ill. 2d 579, 370
N.E.2d 173, 180 (1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 820 (1978). Talsky involved adver-
tisement by a chiropractor which included pictures of "patients" in the before
and after mode. The advertisements in question contained very little substantive
information and the court found them to be highly misleading.
91. Bolton v. Kansas State Bd. of Healing Arts, 473 F. Supp. 728, 736 (D.
Kan. 1979).
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Proving substantial potential for abuse is not easy as Metpath,
Inc. v. Myers92 and Bolton v. Kansas State Board of Healing
Arts9" clearly show. Metpath involved a California statute that
prohibited medical laboratories from advertising their clinical lab-
oratory procedures to the lay public.9 4 The district court rejected
the State's claim that such advertising was inherently misleading.95
Among other factors considered by the court was the fact that a
physician had to recommend the tests before they could be per-
formed. The court also felt that the advertisement itself was fairly
clear and understandable. Although Metpath was decided prior
to Friedman and American Medical Association, the burden
placed on the state was still substantial: "if the rationales offered
to justify the suppression of speech cannot withstand close scru-
tiny, the statute must fall."'97
In Bolton, a case decided subsequent to Friedman but prior to
America Medical Association, the district court was confronted
with a challenge to a Kansas statute which permitted the State
Board of Healing Arts to revoke, suspend or limit a license of a
physician or other member of the healing arts who used advertise-
ments for the purpose of solicitation of professional patronage.98 In
addition, the license could be revoked, suspended or limited for
92. 462 F. Supp. 1104 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
93. 473 F. Supp. 728 (D. Kan. 1979).
94. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 1320(h) (West 1979).
95. 462 F. Supp. 1104, 1109 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
96. Id. at 1109-10. The Court actually looked at three advertisements in
Metpath. The first ad described the results of recent medical research which sup-
posedly demonstrated a correlation between certain cholesterol levels and the fre-
quency of heart disease. It claimed that Eskimos almost never die of heart disease
because of their diet, which, along with regular exercise, produces higher levels of
a certain type of cholesterol known as High Density Lipoproteins (HDL). The ad
claimed that Metpath could perform a laboratory procedure capable of determin-
ing the level of HDL present in the patient's blood. The ad ended by saying
"[w]e're Metpath. We help your physician find out more about you. And even
though all laboratory tests must be ordered through your physician, we thought
you should know something about us." The second ad described a new clinical
laboratory test, introduced by Metpath, which measured the amount of glucose
stored by the red blood cells. Metpath's ad claimed that this new test was more
accurate and less expensive than other similar procedures and would allow physi-
cians to prescribe with greater precision the daily insulin requirements of diabetic
patients. The third ad was very general in nature and extolled the efficiency of
Metpath, Inc. Id. at 1111-13.
97. Id. at 1108.
98. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-2836, 2337 (Supp. 1979).
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unethical conduct which, according to Kansas Administrative Reg-
ulation 100-18-1, included virtually any form of advertising.9 9 The
court found "no distinction between lawyers and health care pro-
fessionals in the area of advertising";10 and in light of various Su-
preme Court decisions, including Bates and Friedman, such re-
strictions must be invalidated to the extent "that the provision
bars truthful advertising through the media" as violative of the
first amendment.'0 1
This very problem has begun to arise in North Carolina as
members of the health care professions begin to advertise.1 0 2 As
North Carolina, like Kansas, is attempting to place blanket
prohibitions on advertisements by health care professionals for the
solicitation of professional patronage, 03 the various health care
boards probably will attempt to enforce such bans, giving rise to
yet another challenge to a restriction on commercial speech. So
99. Kan. Admin. Reg. 100-18-1(a) (1979) (quoted in Bolton v. Kansas State
Bd. of Healing Arts, 473 F. Supp. 728, 735 (D. Kan. 1979)).
100. Bolton v. Kansas State Bd. of Healing Arts, 473 F. Supp. 728, 735 (D.
Kan. 1979).
101. Id. at 736.
102. In the wake of American Medical Association and Friedman, several
dentists and chiropractors have begun advertising on television and in
newspapers.
103. A good example of this is N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-41(a) (1975) which
provides:
The North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners shall have the
power and authority to . . . (3) revoke or suspend a license to practice
dentistry and (4) invoke such other disciplinary measures, censure, or
probative terms against a licensee . . . in any instance or instances in
which the Board is satisfied that such . . . licensee: (18) has, directly or
indirectly, advertised in any manner for professional patronage or busi-
ness; provided, however, it shall not be considered advertising for a den-
tist ... to place his name, office address, telephone number, and office
hours in an approved register or other publication, or to place his name
followed by the word, "dentist", on the door or window of his office, or to
place his name before the public in any other manner expressly approved
by the Board.
As N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-14 (Supp. 1979), which regulates the activities of physi-
cians, is tied directly to the ethics of the medical profession which the FTC or-
dered the AMA to drop, whether or not a ppysician could be punished for adver-
tising under this statute as it is now written is uncertain. Although the AMA has
given notice of appeal, their winning either a reversal or a major modification of
the FTC order is unlikely as the FTC order is merely a logical extension of Bates
and Friedman.
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long as the advertisement is truthful, capable of verification"0 4 and
presented in such a manner and form so that the general public is
capable of understanding them, 05 the challenges will be successful
and the restrictions will fall by the wayside as the State finds it is
unable to carry the burden placed on it by the Supreme Court in
Friedman.
Lex Allen Watson II
104. Bolton v. Kansas State Bd. of Healing Arts, 473 F. Supp. 728, 736 (D.
Kan. 1979).
105. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 16 (1979).
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